INTRODUCTION

County of Los Angeles v. Mendez
1 is the Supreme Court's most recent decision rejecting excessive force liability. Mendez overturned a $4 million shooting-related damages award obtained by civil rights plaintiffs at trial. 2 Plaintiffs Angel Mendez and Jennifer Garcia were asleep in their home, a one-room shack, when Los Angeles County Sheriff's deputies searching for a parolee-at-large entered without a warrant and without announcing their presence. 3 Mendez grabbed hold of a BB gun to steady himself; the deputies reacted by shooting fifteen rounds at the plaintiffs, hitting both Mendez and Garcia, who was pregnant, multiple times. 4 Mendez's right leg was eventually amputated below the knee. 5 The Court held that the deputies did not use excessive force when they shot Mendez and Garcia-even though the shooting victims were not the parolee-at-large the deputies sought. 6 The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, had previously held that though it was reasonable to shoot the plaintiffs because of the BB gun, the plaintiffs could nevertheless recover shooting damages because the shooting was provoked by the deputies' unconstitutional entry into the shack. 7 Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's "provocation rule," even if the use of force is determined to be reasonable, any provocation of the force attributable to law enforcement becomes its own Fourth Amendment violation. 8 Under the provocation rule, an independent constitutional violation can render a reasonable use of force unreasonable as a matter of law. 9 The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's provocation rule, upending the theory upon which the plaintiffs' damages award was based. 10 It remanded Mendez to the Ninth Circuit with instructions to revisit the appellate court's prior proximate cause analysis-in particular, "whether proximate cause permits [plaintiffs] to recover damages for their shooting injuries based on the deputies' failure to secure a warrant at the outset." 11 The reflexive reaction to Mendez is that it narrowed civil rights plaintiffs' excessive force recovery chances, 12 Even the Court acknowledged that, though legally unsound, the provocation rule "may be motivated by the notion" that officers should be held liable when their constitutional torts have foreseeable consequences. 19 As Professor Rory Little has highlighted, there are hints of compromise in the Mendez opinion, acknowledgments that the shooting rule' . . . that gave victims of police shootings an additional route to sue for alleged excessive force").
13. Savage, supra note 2; see also might have offended certain Justices, including Justice Sotomayor. At oral argument, she noted that the plaintiffs "'had nothing to do with' the event" that brought deputies to the plaintiffs' shack.
20
Yet there is more to Mendez than judicial compromise. The opinion rejected the plaintiffs' damages award only to the extent that it was based on a provocation theory. 21 Mendez expressly notes how the plaintiffs themselves, and others like them, might use an alternative argument to support a successful bid for shooting-related damages. 22 Mendez is clear that if the warrantless search proximately caused the shooting, then that violation could support the recovery of damages. 23 This acknowledgment offers plaintiffs a way to avoid difficult-to-overcome excessive force precedent. It opens a door that seemed to be not only closed but locked for good.
For this reason, on remand, the Mendez plaintiffs face fewer obstacles than they would if excessive force were their only path to relief. They need argue only that their shooting damages were proximately caused by the warrantless entry. The plaintiffs already obtained a ruling at trial that the warrantless entry into their home "violated Plaintiffs' clearly established Fourth Amendment rights." 24 This holding was affirmed on appeal.
25
There is no qualified immunity hurdle left to overcome on this claim. They may be able to once again obtain a multimillion-dollar verdict. In some ways, Mendez simply allows plaintiffs to use provocation facts to support proximate cause conclusions. Whether an officer created the situation that led to a shooting was relevant to proving provocation and may still be relevant to proving proximate causation. But Mendez's concession does not overturn the officer-friendly rationale present in prior excessive force precedent, under which officers perhaps faced more-dangerous circumstances than a one-room shack and less sympathetic plaintiffs than Mendez and Garcia. By asking plaintiffs to proximately connect shooting damages to prior constitutional violations, the Court preserved the principle that a reasonable use of force cannot be the foundation upon which plaintiffs recover damages.
Still, inviting plaintiffs to use a different theory of recovery is a far cry from precluding all shooting damages. Therefore, this Piece contends that Mendez is an exciting development for civil rights plaintiffs 20. Little, supra note 19 (explaining that the Court avoided a 4-4 tie by rejecting the Ninth Circuit's provocation rule and restating the basic principle that reasonableness controls excessive force analyses).
21 a seizure complies with the Fourth Amendment." 32 To determine whether force was reasonable, relevant government interests are balanced against an individual's Fourth Amendment interests. 33 In this context, courts consider the totality of the circumstances and judge the force's reasonableness from a reasonable officer's perspective "rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."
34 If a seizure was reasonable, "there is no valid excessive force claim." 35 As Professor Avidan Cover has recently explained, the right to be free from excessive force has been so curtailed by the Supreme Court that it is "exceedingly difficult for victims of police brutality to overcome defendants' motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment." 36 Two "doctrinal shifts" have limited plaintiffs' recovery chances:
First, the Court has diminished a victim's civil rights remedy through a substantive constitutional standard under the Fourth Amendment that privileges the police perspective in excessive force cases, affording latitude to escalation of violence and to police biases. Second, the Court has developed a qualified immunity doctrine that approaches "absolute immunity" for police, holding only "the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law" potentially responsible for excessive force and avoiding development of constitutional limitations on police violence.
37
As a result, there have been no findings of law enforcement excessive force liability for police-involved shootings even when the facts begged for some sort of legal consequence. For example, in Plumhoff v. Rickard, the Court excused shooting into a fleeing suspect's car fifteen times following a high-speed chase. 38 The shooting killed the driver and passenger.
39 Plumhoff began as a traffic stop-one of the vehicle's headlights was not working-and ended in two deaths. Conley and Pederson proceeded to the home's rear and came upon three metal storage sheds and a one-room shack. 53 No one was inside the sheds. 54 They approached the shack's wooden door, which was covered by a blue blanket. 55 Mendez and Garcia were inside the shack, though the deputies did not know this when they approached. 56 They had no warrant to search the shack, nor did they knock or announce their presence. 57 Instead, Conley pulled back the blue blanket and opened the wooden door.
58
Mendez and Garcia were napping on a futon inside. 59 Mendez, who kept a BB gun in the shack "for use on rats and other pests," thought that Ms. Hughes had entered and picked up the BB gun "so he could stand up and place it on the floor."
60 When Conley entered the shack, Mendez was holding the BB gun, pointing it "somewhat south towards Deputy Conley." 61 Conley yelled "Gun!" and then Conley and Pederson discharged fifteen rounds, injuring both Mendez and Garcia. 62 Mendez's right leg was later amputated below his knee.
63
Mendez and Garcia brought suit under § 1983, alleging Fourth Amendment violations based on the warrantless shack entry, the deputies' failure to knock and announce their presence outside the shack, and the use of excessive force after entering the shack. 64 Following a bench trial, the district court ruled for plaintiffs with respect to their warrantless entry and knock-and-announce claims, awarding nominal damages. 65 It also found that the defendants' use of force was excessive and awarded around $4 million as to that claim. 66 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the knock-and-announce ruling, finding 52. Id that the officers had qualified immunity. 67 However, like the district court, the Ninth Circuit held that the officers were liable for the warrantless entry. 68 It also found the officers liable for excessive force because they brought about the shooting by entering the shack without a warrant. 69 Much of the Court's opinion, written by Justice Alito and joined by all members save for Justice Gorsuch, who took no part in the decision, is devoted to overruling the Ninth Circuit's "provocation rule." Pursuant to the provocation rule, even if an officer's use of force is deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a previous Fourth Amendment violation tied to the later use of force "may then serve as the foundation of the plaintiff's excessive force claim," 70 as it provoked the use of force. In Mendez, the Ninth Circuit found that the shooting of Mendez and Garcia was reasonable and not excessive. Nevertheless, it could create excessive force liability because the warrantless shack entry "intentionally and recklessly brought about the shooting."
71
In rejecting the provocation rule, the Court reaffirmed that reasonableness is the exclusive standard under which Fourth Amendment use of excessive force claims are judged. 72 The reasonableness inquiry is objective, "based upon the information the officers had when the conduct occurred." 73 An unsuccessful excessive force claim cannot be converted into a successful one because of a separate constitutional violation. 74 Therefore, Mendez and Garcia should not have been awarded damages for excessive force. 75 However, the Court did not hold that Mendez and Garcia were barred from recovering damages. Rather, they could still recover damages "proximately caused by the warrantless entry."
76
Section 1983 "creates a species of tort liability," 77 and rules derived from the common law of torts "provide the appropriate starting point for the inquiry under § 1983." 78 The Court instructed that, on remand, the Ninth Circuit should "revisit the question whether proximate cause permits respondents to recover damages for their shooting injuries based on the deputies' failure to secure a warrant at the outset." 79 The Ninth Circuit, the Court held, had failed to apply the proper proximate cause analysis, which "required consideration of the 'foreseeability or the scope of the risk created by the predicate conduct'" and analysis of whether there existed "'some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.'" 80 The Court further identified the parties' arguments and those made by the United States as amicus as "a useful starting point" for the proximate cause inquiry. 
84
Paroline is not a case about proximate cause; rather, it grappled primarily with but-for causation.
85
Paroline offers only general guidance about proximate cause. The relevant portions cited by Mendez set forth basic standards, including that a court must consider (1) "foreseeability or the scope of the risk created by the predicate conduct" and (2) whether "there was 'some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.'" 90 In other words, Paroline does not introduce a novel way to argue proximate causation for shooting damages.
In addition to citing Paroline, the Mendez Court directed the Ninth Circuit to consider the proximate cause arguments made by the parties and the United States as amicus. 91 Their proximate cause theories come closer to the kind of analysis the Court seemed to invite. Defendants argued that the failure to secure a search warrant did not proximately cause the injuries because "[a] search warrant is not . . . directed at preventing physical injuries."
92 As a result, the scope of the risk created by the officers' failure to obtain a warrant did not include the risk that plaintiffs "would be shot by the police in reasonable self-defense." 93 Defendants contended that even if a warrant had been obtained, and the deputies had one in their pockets, "the outcome would have been the same: Mr. Mendez would still have thought it was Ms. Hughes at the door and would have picked up his gun to move it while sitting up in bed," and therefore "Deputy Conley would still have seen the gun pointing at him, and the Deputies would still have fired shots in reasonable selfdefense."
94 Alternatively, defendants argued that "because Mr. Mendez's act of pointing a gun at the Deputies was a superseding cause of Plaintiffs' ensuing injuries," his actions "cut off any possibility of liability for the shooting." the legal authority for a non-consensual search." 96 Unlawfully entering the plaintiffs' home could lead to a foreseeable violent confrontation. 97 Plaintiffs also contended that the act of holding a BB gun was not culpable; therefore, it was not a superseding cause of the shooting.
98
Plaintiffs refuted defendants' conclusion that the shooting would still have happened if a warrant had been obtained, explaining:
First In the relevant passages of their reply, defendants argued that plaintiffs conflated the risks created by a failure to knock and announce, for which the deputies were not liable, with the limited risks created by a failure to obtain a warrant. 100 Defendants also disputed plaintiffs' argument that a superseding cause cuts off liability only when the actor's conduct is culpable, instead contending that a "superseding cause . . . may be tortious or entirely innocent." 101 In support of defendants, the United States argued that "it is generally not foreseeable that entering a home without a warrant would lead to violence." 102 III. THE MENDEZ COURT'S PROXIMATE CAUSE BLUEPRINT The Court's citation to Paroline and the above-referenced briefs suggest that a successful proximate cause analysis would demonstrate that (1) avoiding violence is one of the interests protected by the warrant requirement; (2) the risk of violence is a foreseeable consequence of a There is some argument that a general, unfettered search, with no known limits, violent or nonviolent, is a risk against which the Fourth Amendment protects. Mendez and Garcia could be presented as victims of a general search.
Second, a plaintiff might argue that violence is a foreseeable consequence of a warrantless entry. Put another way, would a warrant have avoided the shooting in Mendez? Arguably, yes. The team briefing that preceded the search of the Hughes residence included information about two individuals who lived in the backyard, one of whom was pregnant. Wouldn't a warrant for the shack have included the same information? If armed with a warrant, the deputies would likely have read it. If the deputies had been reminded of the presence of two individuals, neither of whom was the parolee they were searching for, they likely would not have pulled back the blue blanket on the shack's door. Rather, they would have presumably knocked and announced their presence. Had they done so, Mendez could have decided whether to grab his BB gun. Realizing that officers were nearby, he would have likely kept his BB gun far away from his person. Without the BB gun element, the deputies would not have felt the need to use deadly force, and no one would have opened fire on the shack's occupants.
Third, it is possible to construct an argument under which Mendez's act of holding the BB gun is not a superseding cause. As plaintiffs intimated, Mendez did not intentionally aim his BB gun at the deputies. Rather, he thought that someone who knew that he might be holding a BB gun and would not be threatened by it had entered his home. As a result, his actions, which occurred after he was awoken from a midday nap, are not the kind of "free, deliberate, and informed" acts that break the chain of causation between a wrongdoer's conduct and a foreseeable consequence. warrantless entry to a shooting. However, the invitation to present shooting damages as something other than excessive force damages is one that civil rights plaintiffs should seize. If they can overcome qualified immunity with respect to a Fourth Amendment claim that is not based on excessive force, then there might be a way of finally fulfilling § 1983's deterrent purpose. More shooting damages may eventually mean fewer shootings.
CONCLUSION
At a recent speech delivered to Suffolk, New York, police officers, President Trump made light of the officers' obligation to use care when placing a suspect in a police vehicle. "Please don't be too nice," he advised them.
113 Some officers applauded, and others even laughed. For victims of police violence, Trump's comments might have been perceived as the ultimate insult-the suggestion that less care is needed when police interact with the citizenry is a heartbreaking response to rampant police violence. Excessive force precedent can at times inspire the same sense of hopelessness that President Trump's comments did. In recent cases, even the most egregious and regrettable uses of force, arising out of what started out as innocuous encounters with the police but nevertheless resulted in someone's death, have been found to be reasonable.
Enter the Mendez case. At first blush, it is yet another example of the Supreme Court refusing to find excessive force, even though the two individuals who were shot had no connection to the crime or individual the deputies sought when they crossed the deputies' path. Yet Mendez merits a second look. First, it opens the door to recovering shooting damages outside of the excessive force framework. Second, it signals a desire to strictly adhere to tort principles in § 1983 precedent, but in a plaintiff-friendly way.
The Mendez opinion does not announce a need to provide a meaningful remedy for every instance of police violence. But it does at least acknowledge the belief, held by some, perhaps even by some members of the Court, that "it is important to hold law enforcement officers liable for the foreseeable consequences of all of their constitutional torts."
114 This alone is a concession that officer accountability is a legitimate goal of social policy and even the law. Perhaps the next § 1983 case will go even further, refusing to blindly accept an officer's use of force that results in avoidable injury or death. 
